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The Present Sense Impression Exception
to the Hearsay Rule: Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(1)
I. Introduction
In addition to affecting trial practice in the federal courts, the Federal
Rules of Evidence will have great impact on state court litigation as courts
and legislatures adopt rules patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence
803(1).1 The federal recognition of the present sense impression as a
distinct exception to the hearsay rule marks a significant step in
modifying courtroom practice in a manner that has long been propounded
by prominent legal writers.
2
The exception for present sense impressions 3 is included in Rule 803
with more traditional hearsay exceptions, manifesting a philosophy that
evidence with certain basic assurances of reliability should be admitted
despite the absence of the usual safeguards of cross-examination and
oath.4 A declaration of a present sense impression is credible because it is
a spontaneous expression of immediate sensual impressions, unaffected
by retrospective thought.5 In addition, the witness reporting the remark
has often observed the event and can verify the statement. 6
Although the exception has been supported by commentators since
I. FED. R. EvID. 803(l).
Rule 803 - The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter.
2. See notes 32-37, 43'and accompanying text infra.
3. Present sense impressions often take the form of such statements as "Look at those
fools go." Moreno v. Hawbaker, 157 Cal. App. 2d 627, 321 P.2d 538 (1958); "Driving like that
he will land in hell." Everready Cab Co. v. Wilhite, 66 Ga. App. 851, 19 S.E.2d 343 (1942);
"Look out. He has got a razor." People v. Rice, 109 111. App. 2d 391,248 N.E.2d 745 (1969); "1
believe that lady is going to try to beat that car across the road." Standard Coffee v. Carr, 171
Miss. 714, 157 So. 685 (1934); "Seems like there is a car being stripped down the street there."
Anderson v. State, 454 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); or "My, Art, that car is coming
fast!" Heg v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 P. 51 (1921).
4. Comment, Major Changes Under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 37TENN.
L. REV. 556, 561 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Major Changes].
5. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31
YALE L.J. 229, 236 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Morgan, Classification]. See notes 63, 72-82
and accompanying text infra.
6. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 298 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MCCORMICK]; Major Changes, supra note 4, at 560-61. See notes 72-82 and
accompanying text infra.
1881,7 well-reasoned judicial discussion is rare8 for two primary reasons.
First, since unexciting events are unlikely to evoke comment, decisions
concerning present sense impressions in unexciting circumstances are less
numerous than decisions involving excited utterances.9 Second, and more
importantly, examinations of the trustworthiness of unexcited statements
are rare because most courts admit spontaneous statements by citing the
res gestae concept"' without considering more specific justifications."
Even among courts that admit spontaneous utterances, the vast
majority follow Wigmore's view, 12 requiring the declarant to be under the
influence of a startling occurrence in order for his statement to be
admissible. 3 Several courts, in excluding present sense impressions,
have expressed the opinion that to admit such statements would be to
open the door to a flood of comments and opinions of questionable value
in deciding issues of fact.' 4 There is, however, strong justification for
admitting spontaneous observations made in the absence of nervous
excitement. 15
This comment discusses the rationale and justifications supporting
the recognition of this new, distinct exception to the hearsay rule. An
examination of the historical treatment of statements now denominated
"present sense impressions" demonstrates how other doctrines and
concepts have operated to obscure the principles of this exception. The
scope and requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) are analyzed
in light of the commentaries and cases that have led to its adoption.
II. The Res Gestae Doctrine
Although courts have admitted numerous statements that meet the
criteria of Rule 803(1), most have done so by calling them part of the res
gestae, without analyzing the underlying justifications for admission. 16 In
7. See notes 32-37, 43 and accompanying text infra.
8. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hanwick, 228 Ala. 336, 153 So. 269 (1934); Dameron v. Ansbro,
39 Cal. App. 289, 178 P. 874 (1918); Eveready Cab Co. v. Wilhite, 66 Ga. App. 815, 19 S.E.2d
343 (1942).
9. The excited utterance cases come under FED. R. EVID. 803(2). See, e.g., People v.
Alexander, I 1 111. App. 3d 782, 298 N.E.2d 355 (1973); People v. Arnold, 41 App. Div. 2d 573,
339 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1973); Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972).
10. The phrase res gestae means literally 'the thing done' and it is used in law as
meaning the circumstances which are the automatic and undesigned incidents of
the particular act in issue, and which are admissible in evidence when illustrative
and explanatory of the act. The phrase is frequently applied to statements or
explanations made in regard to an act in question by witnesses thereof.
Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 297, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (1937) (citations omitted).
I1. See. e.g., Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. 512, 143 S.E. 896 (1928); Young v. Stewart,
191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926); State v. McKinney, 13 N.C. App. 214, 184 S.E.2d 897
(1971); Hornschuch v. Southern Pac. Co., 101 Ore. 280, 203 P. 886 (1921); State v. Long, 186
S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938); Mathewson v. Olmstead, 126 Wash. 269,218 P. 226(1923); Heg
v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 P. 51 (1921).
12. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1750 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text infra.
13. See note 9 supra.
14. See, e.g., Louisville &N. Ry. v. Cox, 145 Ky. 716.141 S.W. 59(191 1);Shadowski v.
Pittsburgh Ry., 226 Pa. 537,75 A. 730(1910); Barnett v. Bull, 141 Wash. 139, 250 P. 955 (1926).
15. See note 34 and accompanying text infra.
16. See note 11 supra.
other cases present sense impressions were excluded because they did not
fit within the current definition of the res gestae concept.I 7
The res gestae doctrine is much used as an exception to the hearsay
rule for spontaneous utterances, 18 yet
rtlhe difficulty of formulating a description of the 'res gestae'
which will serve for all cases, seems insurmountable. To make
the attempt is something like trying to execute a portrait that
shall enable the possessor to recognize every member of a very
numerous family.' 9
The doctrine allows the admission of declarations that accompanied the
principal litigated fact2" and that could be viewed as created by, or
springing from, the transaction itself. 2 These declarations are often
described as "the facts of the principal transactions speaking through the
mouth of the witness rather than the witness talking about the facts."
22
Statements of this type are admitted because they are considered to be a
part of the act or event. 23 This rationale strictly limits the scope of the
doctrine to contemporaneous statements made by a participant at the
place of the occurrence.
24
Several writers25 have expressed a feeling of despair in trying to deal
with the res gestae concept because many courts use it as a term of
convenience to avoid determining less superficial reasons for admitting
out-of-court statements. 26 The doctrine is also criticized on grounds that
the evidentiary problems to which it is applied could be resolved by the
application of some other well-established principle. 27 Its ambiguity
17. See Konidaris v. Burgess, 223 Ala. 512, 137 So. 303 (1931); Johnson v. Newell, 160
Conn. 269,278 A.2d 776(1971); Eveready Cab Co. v. Wilhite, 66Ga. App. 815, 19S.E.2d 343
(1942); Wrage v. King, 114 Kan. 539, 220 P. 259 (1923); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Cox, 145 Ky.
716, 141 S.W. 59 (1911); Ideal Cement Co. v. Killingsworth, 198 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1967);
Standard Coffee v. Carr, 171 Miss. 714, 157 So. 685 (1934); Swinson v. Nance, 219 N.C. 772,
15 S.E.2d 284 (1941); Shadowski v. Pittsburgh Ry., 226 Pa. 537, 75 A. 730 (1910); Gouin v.
Ryder, 38 R.I. 31,94 A. 670 (1915); Montesi v. State, 220 Tenn. 354, 417 S.W.2d 554 (1967);
Barnett v. Bull, 141 Wash. 139, 250 P. 955 (1926); Mercer Funeral Home v. Addison Bros. &
Smith, 111 W. Va. 616, 163 S.E. 439 (1932). See notes 64-68 and accompanying text infra.
18. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 1745; MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 288.
19. Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 374, 410 (1879).
20. The principal litigated fact, or ultimate fact in issue, is sometimes described as the
final or resulting fact reached by processes of logical reasoning from the detached or
successive evidence, and which is fundamental and determinative of the whole case. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1692 (4th ed. 1951).
21. State v. McKinney, 13 N.C. App. 214, 184 S.E.2d897(1971);PacificMut. Life Ins.
Co. of Cal. v. Schlakzug, 143Tex. 264, 183 S.W.2d 709(1944); Barnett v. Bull, 141 Wash. 139,
250 P. 955 (1926); WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 1745-46.
22. State v. Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938); see Comment, Spontaneous
Exclamations in the Absence of a Startling Event, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 430(1946) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Spontaneous Exclamations].
23. State v. Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938).
24. Comment, Spontaneous Exclamations, supra note 22.
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 288; E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 328-29
(1962) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN]; WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 1745-46; Slough, Spontane-
ous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224 (1961); Thayer, Bedingfield's
Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta(pts. 1-3), 14AM. L. REV. 817, 15 AM. L. REV. I,
71 (1880-81).
26. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 288; MORGAN, supra note 25, at 328-29; Slough, supra
note 25, at 224; Thayer, supra note 25, 15 AM. L. REV. I (1881).
27. The res gestae doctrine covers four presently recognized exceptions to the hearsay
rule: present sense impression, excited utterance, then existing mental, emotional or physical
condition, and present bodily condition. Wabisky v. D.C. Transit System, 309 F.2d 317 (D.C.
invites confusion among the various concepts it embraces, resulting in
uncertainty as to the limitations of each.2 8 Even Wigmore was forced to
admit that his attempt to analyze the several concepts implicit in the term
"res gestae" did not reflect the law propounded by the courts. 29 The
following words of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Matop° are
echoed by many authorities:
[A]s for res gestae, it is a phrase which has been accountable for
so much confusion that it had best be denied any place
whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything but an un-
willingness to think at all, what it covers cannot be put in less
intelligible terms.
31
III. The Development of the Present Sense Impression Exception
The late Professor Thayer of Harvard Law School first proposed an
exception to the hearsay rule32 for
declarations of fact which were very near in time to that which
they tended to prove, fill out, or illustrate, being at the same
time not narrative, but importing what was then present or but
just gone by, and so was open, either immediately or in the
indications of it, to the observation of the witness who testifies
to the declaration, and who can be cross-examined as to those
indications.
33
Thayer felt that the contemporaneity of the out-of-court statement would
as adequately guarantee trustworthiness 34 as does the spontaneity of
excited utterances. 3 From his examination of the case law, Thayer
deduced four conditions of admissibility for statements of present sense
impression: (1) there must be a main event or condition that is material or
relevant to the case; (2) the statement must be substantially contem-
poraneous with the main event or condition; (3) the statement must prove
or elucidate the event; and (4) the statement must be made to a witness
who testifies to it and can be cross-examined as to its accuracy.
36
Cir. 1962); State v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450,513 P.2d 258 (1973); Commonwealth v. Coleman,
458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974); MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 288; Slough, supra note 25.
28. Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971); Illinois Cent. Ry. v.
Lowery, 184 Ala. 443, 63 So. 952 (1913).
29. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 1745.
30. 146 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1944).
31. United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944).
32. Thayer, supra note 25, at 15 AM. L. REV. 71, 107 (1881).
33. Id.
34. See notes 72-82 and accompanying text infra.
35. WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 1747, 1750. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
In 1928, Professor Robert M. Hutchins and Donald Slesinger of Yale Law School
examined the psychological justification for the exception for spontaneous utterances. Their
study indicated that calm observations presented an ideal exception to the hearsay rule
providing greater probability of accuracy because of the absence of stress and excitement.
The article noted the marked preference of the courts for excited utterances, but concluded
that these were less trustworthy than unexcited statements. Though conceding that excite-
ment does tend to still the reflective faculties and prevent statements colored by self interest,
the authors pointed out that it also has the effect of rendering observation and judgment all but
impossible. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 432 (1928).
36. Thayer, supra note 25, at 15 AM. L. REV. I, 71 (1881).
Wigmore's analysis, while clarifying to some extent the concepts of
res gestae and spontaneous utterances, unfortunately led to the restriction
of the spontaneous utterance exception to excited utterances. 37 The
disinclination of the courts to adopt the present sense impression
exception may be attributed to Wigmore's influence.3 8 Although he
recognized an exception for spontaneous utterances, he insisted that only
a startling event could guarantee trustworthiness.39 For Thayer's prime
requirement of contemporaneity, 4° Wigmore substituted the spontaneity
of the exclamation produced by the shock or excitement of the
declarant. 41 He discounted the importance of the circumstantial
safeguards emphasized by Thayer and criticized his analysis. 42 Yet the
importance placed by Wigmore upon the occurrence of an exciting event
is highly suspect, since it results in the exclusion of statements less
subject to the perceptual unreliability caused by stress.
43
Both the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence' and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence45 contain a specific present sense impression
exception. The provision adopted in the Federal Rules is substantially the
same as those contained in these previous codes. An examination of the
history of the exception has shown that this is not a novel idea to legal
scholars .46
37. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 1745-64.
38. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 298; MORGAN, supra note 25, at 342;4 J. WEINSTEIN,
EVIDENCE § 803(1)[01] (1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]; Quick, Hearsay, Excitement,
Necessity and the Uniform Rules, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204 (1960).
39. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 1756.
40. See notes 72-82 and accompanying text infra.
41. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 1756. The excited utterance need not be strictly
contemporanious; it may be admissible so long as the controlling influence of the excitement
continues.
42. "To admit hearsay testimony simply because it was uttered at the time something
else was going on is to introduce an arbitrary and unreasoned test, and to remove all limits of
principle .. " WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 1757 at 238.
43. MC CORMICK, supra note 6, § 298; Stewart, Perception, Memory & Hearsay, 1970
UTAH L. REV. I.
Professor Edmund Morgan of Vanderbilt University School of Law is the leading
modern advocate of the present sense impression exception. He has taken issue with
Wigmore's requirement of an exciting event and deplores the apparent assumption of the
courts that the acceptance of the Wigmore doctrine implies a rejection of Thayer's exception.
See MORGAN, supra note 25; Morgan, Classification, supra note 5; Morgan, Res Gestae, 12
WASH. L. REV. 91 (1937).
44. Model Code of Evidence.
Rule 512. Contemporaneous or Spontaneous Statements. Evidence of a hearsay
statement is admissible if the judge finds that the hearsay statement was made (a)
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the statement
narrates or describes or explains, or immediately thereafter.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 512(l) (1942).
45. Uniform Rules of Evidence
Excited Utterances and Contemporaneous Statements. Rule 63. Evidence of a
statement . . . offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence
and inadmissible except: (4) . . .a statement (a) which the judge finds was made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition which the statements
narrates, describes or explains.
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(4)(a) (1953). The 1953 version of the UNIFORM RULES
was adopted by Kansas, 4 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d)(I), New Jersey, Order Supreme Court
of N.J., June 6, 1967, and California, CAL.. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1240 (1965). In 1974 the
UNIFORM RULES were changed to conform as closely as possible to the FED. R. EVID. Hence,
Rule 803(l) of the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE is now identical to the FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
46. See notes 32-43 and accompanying text, supra.
IV. The Scope of Rule 803(1)
A. Availability of the Declarant
The traditional hearsay rule is based upon the premise that
cross-examination, testimony under oath, and observation of the
demeanor of a witness enable the trier of fact to weigh the trustworthiness
of statements made in court.47 The Federal Rules adopted a general rule
excluding hearsay,48 with two broad exceptions. The first exception is
found in Rule 803, which allows the admission of certain hearsay
statements because there are adequate assurances of their accuracy that
are not likely to be enhanced by the testimony of the declarant himself.49
The second exception, found in Rule 804, bases admissibility on the
necessity that arises when the declarant is unavailable.50 The present
sense impression exception is included in Rule 803, which does not
require a showing of unavailability. 5' Previously, most courts that
recognized the present sense impression exception required that the
declarant be unavailable.52 They would, therefore, have included it in
Rule 804 as an exception to the hearsay rule justified by necessity. One
recent commentary questions the accuracy of many assumptions concern-
ing the reliability of perception and memory that have been applied to
evaluate the accuracy of testimony and suggests that unavailability be
made a condition precedent to the admission of present sense
impressions. 
53
In many cases a reported statement was made by a bystander who
was unidentified and, consequently, unavailable to testify. In
Hornschuch v. Southern Pacific Co., 54 for example, a train passenger
testified to having heard an unidentified woman on the road shout to a
motorist just before a collision. In cases in which the declarant is
unavailable, the statement could often be found admissible under
necessity principles. Sometimes, however, it is the declarant who testifies
as to his or her own out-of-court statements. The inclusion of the present
sense impression exception under Rule 804 would have operated to
exclude these statements when the declarant was available for testimony,
in spite of circumstantial guarantees of accuracy surrounding them.
55
47. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
48. FED. R. EvID. 802.
49. Major Changes, supra note 4, at 560.
50. This broad exception would admit certain types of hearsay when the declarant is
unavailable for any of a variety of reasons such as death, illness, lack of memory, or refusal to
testify. FED. R. EVID. 804.
51. At least one writer, however, exhibits a feeling that this exception might have been
more appropriately included in Rule 804. Stewart, supra note 43.
52. Swinson v. Nance, 219 N.C. 772, 15 S.E.2d 284 (1941); Shadowski v. Pittsburgh
Ry., 226 Pa. 537, 75 A. 730 (1910); Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 21, 290 P. 970
(1930).
53. Stewart, supra note 43.
54. 101 Ore. 280, 203 P. 886 (1921).
55. See, e.g., Moreno v. Hawbaker, 157 Cal. App. 2d 627, 321 P.2d 538 (1958); Chicago
City Ry. v. McDonough, 221 I1. 69, 77 N.E. 577 (1906); Hastings v. Ross, 211 Kan. 732, 508
P.2d 514 (1973); People v. Gillard, 216 Mich. 461, 185 N.W. 734 (1921); Ideal Cement Co. v.
Killingsworth, 198 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1967); Terwillinger v. Long Island R.R., 152 App. Div.
168, 136 N.Y.S. 733 (1912); State v. McKinney, 13 N.C. App. 214, 184 S.E.2d 897 (1971);
B. Use of Present Sense Impressions
Under Rule 803(1), the declaration of a present sense impression is
admitted as proof of the event described. A number of courts that
previously admitted statements now classified as present sense impressions
restricted them to circumstantial use.56 This is demonstrated in cases that
admit such statements to show that the attention of the witness was turned
to the event.57 An example is found in Emens v. Lehigh Valley Railroad
Co.,58 in which the issue was whether proper warning signals had been
sounded as a train approached the crossing where an accident occurred.
The exclamation of the witness' wife, "Why don't the train whistle?" was
admitted, but only to show that the witness' attention had been called to this
point. The statement could not be used to prove whether or not the whistle
had sounded. Similarly, other courts have limited the use of statements of
present sense impression to showing that the attention of a participant had
been directed to his own danger,59 or to allowing the witness to make his
meaning clear to the jury. 6 It must be emphasized at this point that present
sense impressions, generally admitted as a part of the res gestae, are not
hearsay when used only circumstantially and therefore need no excep-
tion.61 To be admissible as circumstantial evidence rather than proof of
matters asserted, a statement need only meet the tests of relevancy and
materiality. 62 Such attempts to limit the use of present sense impressions
show the misapplication of older cases, which admitted them under the res
gestae doctrine rather than under an independent exception to the hearsay
rule.
C. Requirement of .Contemporaneity
Throughout the discussion of justifications for the present sense
impression exception, it has been stressed that contemporaneity is the
chief safeguard of trustworthiness. 63 An examination of prior case law
indicates, however, that there has been considerable disagreement as to
the meaning of the term "contemporaneity." Courts have differed in
Stanley v. Bowen Bros., 96 N.H. 467,79 A.2d 1(1951); Gouin v. Ryder, 38 R.I. 31,94 A. 670
(1915); Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transport Co., 77 Utah 21, 290 P. 970 (1930); Mathewson v.
Olmstead, 126 Wash. 269,218 P. 226(1923); Mercer Funeral Home v. Addison Bros. & Smith,
Ill W. Va. 616, 163 S.E. 439 (1932).
56. See Emens v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 223 F. 810 (N.D.N.Y. 1915); Moreno v. Haw-
baker, 157 Cal. App. 2d 627, 321 P.2d 538 (1958); Chicago City Ry. v. McDonough, 221 Il1.69,
77 N.E. 577 (1906); Hastings v. Ross, 211 Kan. 732, 508 P.2d 514 (1973); People v. Gillard, 216
Mich. 461, 185 N.W. 734 (1921); Terwillinger v. Long Island R.R., 152 App. Div. 168, 136
N.Y.S. 733 (1912); Stanley v. Bowen Bros., 96 N.H. 467, 79 A.2d 1 (1951).
57. See Emens v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 233 F. 810(N.D.N.Y. 1915); People v. Gillard, 216
Mich. 461, 185 N.W. 734 (1921); Terwillinger v. Long Island R.R., 152 App. Div. 168, 136
N.Y.S. 733 (1912); Stanley v. Bowen Bros., 96 N.H. 467, 79 A.2d 1 (1951).
58. 223 F. 810 (N.D.N.Y. 1915).
59. See Chicago City Ry. v. McDonough, 221 Ill. 69, 77 N.E. 577 (1906); Louisville & N.
Ry. v. Cox, 145 Ky. 716, 141 S.W. 59(19.1 1); Stanley v. Bowen Bros., 96 N.H. 467, 79A.2d 1
(1951).
60. See Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942).
61. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §§ 288-89; WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 1745-46; Morgan,
Classification, supra note 5, at 231.
62. Morgan, Classification, supra note 5, at 239.
63. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO.
L.J. 125 (1973). See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
determining with which event or condition the statement must be
contemporaneous. 64
In instances in which the admissibility of a statement has turned on
whether it was part of the res gestae, the class of acceptable statements
has usually been limited to those that were exactly contemporaneous with
the principal litigated fact.65 These cases have held that indications of
speed or other contributing factors were not part of the res gestae when
there was no knowledge that the event in litigation would occur. 6 6 In this
way, courts have excluded statements, now acceptable as present sense
impressions, because they were made prior to the actual event. 67 This
restriction resulted from the application of the res gestae concept that the
statement must spring out of the event itself.68
When, however, admissibility is based upon circumstantial
safeguards of accuracy, the result is to the contrary ;69 the utterance need be
contemporaneous only with the factor or condition it reports, not with the
ultimate fact in issue.7" There is no valid reason to conclude that the
trustworthiness of an observation is impaired because the ultimate accident
or event could not be anticipated by the declarant at that moment. Rule
803(1) recognizes this and requires only contemporaneity with the event or
condition described by the statement. 7 '
The requirement that the statement be contemporaneous furnishes two
important guarantees of reliability. The first of these is spontaneity.72
When the statement or observation was made with little or no opportunity
64. Compare Konidaris v. Burgess, 223 Ala. 512, 137 So. 303 (1931); Ideal Cement Co.
v. Killingsworth, 198 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1967); andGouin v. Ryder, 38 R.I. 31,94 A. 670 (1915),
with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Murphy, 186 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1951); Silver Seal Prods. Co. v.
Owens, 523 P.2d 1091 (Okla. 1974); and State v. Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938).
65. See Konidaris v. Burgess, 223 Ala. 512, 137 So. 303 (1931); Eveready Cab Co. v.
Wilhite. 66 Ga. App. 815, 19 S.E.2d 343 (1942); Wrage v. King, 114 Kan. 539, 220 P. 259
(1923); Ideal Cement Co. v. Killingsworth, 198 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1967); Gouin v. Ryder, 38
R.I. 31,94 A. 670 (1915); Barnett v., Bull, 141 Wash. 139, 250 P. 955 (1926); Mercer Funeral
Home v. Addison Bros. & Smith, 111 W. Va. 616, 163 S.E. 439 (1932).
66. See cases cited, note 65 supra.
67. Examples of such statements are found in Konidaris v. Burgess, 223 Ala. 512, 137
So. 303 (1931); Eveready Cab Co. v. Wilhite, 66Ga. App. 815, 19 S.E.2d 343 (1942); Louisville
& N. Ry. v. Cox, 145 Ky. 716, 141 S.W. 59 (1911); Ideal Cement Co. v. Killingsworth, 198 So.
2d 248 (Miss. 1967); Standard Coffee v. Carr, 171 Miss. 714, 157 So. 685 (1934); Shadowski v.
Pittsburgh Ry., 226 Pa. 537, 75 A. 730 (1910); Gouin v. Ryder, 38 R.I. 31, 94 A. 670 (1915);
Barnett v. Bull, 141 Wash. 139, 250 P. 955 (1926); Mercer Funeral Home v. Addison Bros. &
Smith, Ill W. Va. 616, 163 S.E. 439 (1932). If redecided under 803(1), these decisions would
probably be to the contrary.
68. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Picker X-ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Murphy, 186 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1951); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 151 Fla. 558, 10So. 2d
83 (1942); Young v. Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926); Silver Seal Prods. Co. v.
Owens, 523 P.2d 1091 (Okla. 1974); Commonwealth v. Coleman 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387
(1974); White Star Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 32 Tenn. App. 177, 222 S.W.2d 209 (1949);
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d474(1942); Marks v. I.M. Pearlstein&
Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943).
70. See cases cited, note 69 supra.
71. See note I and accompanying text supra.
72. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Murphy, 186 F.2d 8(6th Cir. 1951); Young v. Stewart, 191
N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926); Silver Seal Prods. Co. v. Owens, 523 P.2d 1091 (Okla. 1974);
Marks v. I.M. Pearlstein & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943); State v. Long, 186 S.C.
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for reflection, it may be said that the statement was inspired by the event
itself. Because it was, in a sense, more a product of reflex or instinct than of
conscious thought, its reliability is based more on the trustworthiness of the
statement than the veracity of the declarant.73 For this reason it has been
suggested that the testimony of a witness to whom a statement of present
sense impression was made would be admissible even if the declarant were
not qualified to testify for some reason. 74 Excited utterances have been
admitted on this justification even though the declarant was a child,
mentally ill, or a convicted felon, 75 but this idea has not yet been tested in
the area of present sense impressions.
The second safeguard that results from the requirement of contem-
poraneity is the opportunity to cross-examine the reporting witness con-
cerning the fact and content of the statement .76 In the great majority of
cases admitting unexcited contemporaneous declarations, the witness who
heard the declaration also had substantial opportunity to observe the event
or condition.7 7 When the witness is not the declarant, the requirement of
contemporaneity ensures that the statement was made in the presence of a
person capable of testing its accuracy by personal observation of the
event. 78 This opportunity for cross-examination provides assistance to the
jury in its evaluation of the statement and protection against the danger that
too much weight could be attributed to it. 79 When the witness and the
declarant are the same person, as often occurs, 80 the witness may always be
cross-examined as to the events that evoked the statement. Although courts
have occasionally disregarded the requirement that the witness also per-
ceive the event,8" inadequate opportunity to cross-examine someone who
witnessed both the event and the statement may well explain numerous
cases in which statements of present sense impression have been
excluded 82
It must be noted that the availability of a witness to both the statement
and the event is a double-edged sword. The fact that the witness can testify
to the same event or condition as did the declarant has sometimes been used
to exclude the spontaneous utterance as cumulative. 83 The objection that
73. Slough, supra note 25; Comment, Spontaneous Exclamations, supra note 22.
74. Quick, supra note 38.
75. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 297.
76. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 298; MORGAN, supra note 25 at 341.
77. E.g., Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 278 A.2d 776 (1971); Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Getrost, 151 Fla. 558, 10 So. 2d 83 (1942); Hastings v. Ross, 211 Kan. 732,508 P.2d 514 (1973);
Hornschuch v. Southern Pac. Co., 101 Ore. 280, 203 P. 886 (1921); Anderson v. State, 454
S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970); Claybrook v. Acreman, 373 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); Mathewson v. Olmstead, 126 Wash. 269, 218 P. 226 (1923).
78. Morgan, Classification, supra note 5, at 236.
79. Id. at 239.
80. See note 55 supra.
81. SeeThompson v. State, 166 Ga. 512, 143 S.E. 896(1928); State v. Cooper, 195 Iowa
258, 191 N.W. 891 (1923); Rouston v. Detroit United Ry., 151 Mich. 237, 115 N.W. 62 (1908).
82. Slough, supra note 25, at 252.
83. Swinson v. Nance, 219 N.C. 772, 15 S.E.2d 284 (1941); Shadowski v. Pittsburgh
Ry., 226 Pa. 537, 75 A. 730 (1910); Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 21, 290 P. 970
(1930).
evidence is cumulative often arises in fact situations such as that found in
Houston Oxygen Co., Inc. v. Davis,84 an automobile accident case. Mrs.
Cooper, a witness, testified that one of the cars later involved in the
accident had passed hers when she was four or five miles from the scene,
and that she commented at the time, "They must have been drunk," and
''we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept that rate
of speed up.' '85 The other passengers in Mrs. Cooper's car also testified as
to the speed of the car and Mrs. Cooper's statement. Significantly, the
Davis court admitted the statement, holding that it was not cumulative
because the witness was alluding to an occurrence within her own knowl-
edge in language calculated to make her meaning clearer to the jury than
would expressions of opinion as to speed alone. 86 The court noted the
considerable value of such statements both in adding weight and emphasis
to the testimony of the witness and as a valuable and reliable way of
proving the issue.
87
Rule 803(1), like Rule 512(a) of the Model Code of Evidence,
88
includes the phrase "or immediately thereafter.' '89 In this respect, Rule
803(1) and the Model Code provision follow the requirement of "substan-
tial" contemporaneity enunciated by Thayer. 90 Even though contem-
poraneity is the decisive factor guaranteeing a lack of time for fabrication
or failure of memory, Thayer believed that it would be impracticable to
insist on exact contemporaneity. 9' The inclusion of this phrase goes
beyond the stricter common-law holdings. 92
A more conservative view was adopted in Uniform Rule 63(4)(a),
93
which would admit only statements made while the event was being
perceived. 94 Morgan supports this view, asserting that unless strict con-
temporaneity is insisted upon, the guarantee of spontaneity is partially
lacking and the likelihood that the witness will be able to testify as to
personal perception of the same event is considerably weakened.95
The more liberal view reflected by Rule 803(1) is not, however,
without safeguards. If there was a lapse of time between the event and the
statement describing it, the trial court must exercise its discretion in
84. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942).
85. Id. at 5, 161 S.W.2d at 476.
86. Id.
87. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139Tex.], 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); Davis v. Younger
Bros., 260 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Comment, Spontaneous Exclamations, supra
note 22.
88. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 512(I) (1942).
89. Compare note I and accompanying text supra with notes 44, 45 and accompanying
text supra.
90. Thayer, supra note 25.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Murphy, 186 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1951); Manuel v.
American Employers Ins. Co., 212 So. 2d 527 (La. 1968); Ideal Cement Co. v. Killingsworth,
198 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1967); Young v. Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926); Marks v.
I.M. Pearlstein & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Schlakzug, 143 Tex. 264, 183 S.W.2d 709 (1944).
93. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(4)(a) (1953).
94. Quick, supra note 38. See notes 32 and 34 and accompanying text supra.
95. Morgan, Classification, supra note 5, at 236-37.
determining whether the declarant had an opportunity to form a purpose to
misrepresent and whether the guarantees of trustworthiness are still pres-
ent. 96 Most courts apply a more rigid standard of elapsed time for present
sense impressions than for excited utterances, because in the latter case it
might be found that a state of excitement had been prolonged by the
circumstances. 97 If no evidence of the time elapsed is presented, the
foundation for the present sense impression exception is not laid and the
statement must be excluded.
98
The overexpansion of the contemporaneity requirement would defeat
the safeguards of the exception and result in questionable decisions; hence
the meaning to be given to the phrase "or immediately thereafter" is a
matter for sound judicial discretion.99 The phrase should not be used to
admit statements that do no fit within the rationale of the exception, but,
since precise contemporaneity is not always possible, a slight time lapse
should not result in the exclusion of valuable evidence. 00
D. Perception
Another major requirement of the present sense exception is percep-
tion. Courts that have admitted present sense impressions are consistent in
requiring the declarant to have perceived the event or condition
described.' 0 ' This perception requirement is no more than the basic
requirement of firsthand knowledge or specific competency in qualifying a
declarant to testify as to a comment on an event. 102 As long as perception is
established, an observation need not be expressed orally to qualify as a
present sense impression, as, for instance, when a bystander copies a
license plate number during a robbery. 103 Unless perception is made clear,
however, the statement must be excluded. "4
When the declarant does not testify, the court's suspicion of the
witness' testimony may lead it to find that perception was not established.
There is no requirement that the declarant be identified, 05 but it is often
96. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 298; Major Changes, supra note 4, at 561; Morgan,
Classification, supra note 5, at 237.
97. Comment, Excited Utterances & Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661 (1969). See note 41 and accompanying text
supra.
98. Mei v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 159Conn. 307, 268 A.2d639(1970); Manuel
v. American Employers Ins. Co., 212 So. 2d 527 (La. 1968).
99. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 298; WEINSTEIN, supra note 38, 803(1)[011.
100. Picker X-ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969); Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Getrost, 151 Fla. 558, 10 So. 2d 83 (1942); MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 298; WEINSTEIN, supra
note 38, 803(1)[01]; THAYER, supra note 25.
101. See Kelly v. Hanwick, 228 Ala. 336, 153 So. 269(1934); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost,
151 Fla. 558, 10 So. 2d 83 (1942); Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. 512, 143 S.E. 896 (1928);
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); Saint Louis, B. & M. Ry. v.
Watkins, 245 S.W. 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
102. Comment, Spontaneous Exclamations, supra note 22.
103. State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973).
104. Picker X-ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969); McClure v. Price, 300
F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1962).
105. Evans, Article Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 VAL,. U.L. REV. 261, 277
(1974). See note I and accompanying text supra.
easier to establish the contact of an identified declarant with the event in
question, from which contact perception may reasonably be inferred. If the
witness is unable to identify the alleged declarant, the court may consider
the danger of fabrication to have overcome any circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness. The failure to establish perception underlies the
rationale of courts' hesitancy to admit the spontaneous statements of
unidentified bystanders.106 Thus the admissibility of statements made by
unidentified declarants may turn on the availability of other evidence
corroborating the statement and describing the setting in which it was
made. 1
07
Many cases exclude spontaneous statements for lack of perception
due to the requirement of the res gestae doctrine that the event perceived
and described be the principal litigated fact.108 As discussed earlier, 109 the
present sense impression exception covers not only statements inspired by
the main event in issue, but also those describing contributing factors and
circumstantially related events or conditions.
The cases are divided on the issue whether actual sight is required to
establish perception. 110 Some cases hold that one who hears but does not
see cannot have a sufficient opportunity to observe, and that any statement
as to the occurrence is an opinion or conclusion based on things not
witnessed. " ' I Although this viewpoint may well be justified in some cases,
there are many conceivable situations in which aural perception would be
sufficient to establish the occurrence of an event. 112 Visual observation is a
factor to be considered in evaluating the validity of a statement, but an
absolute requirement of visual perception would lead to the exclusion of
valuable evidence.
113
Rule 803(1) does not require that the declarant be a participant in the
event. 114 Earlier cases, basing their rationale on the res gestae doctrine,
excluded statements made by "mere onlookers." 115 It often happens,
106. The court in Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939), for example, excluded
testimony of a witness about remarks he heard at the scene of an accident. The witness could
not tell who the declarants were. In Garrett v. Howden, 73 N.M. 307, 387 P.2d 874 (1963),
testimony relating the remarks of an unidentified woman concerning the speed of the
defendant's automobile before the collision was excluded.
107. WEINSTEIN, supra note 38, 803(1)[01].
108. See Konidaris v. Burgess, 223 Ala. 512, 137 So. 303 (1931); Eveready Cab Co. v.
Wilhite, 66 Ga. App. 815, 19 S.E.2d 343 (1942); State v. Cooper, 195 Iowa 258, 191 N.W. 891
(1923); Barnett v. Bull, 141 Wash. 139, 250 P. 955 (1926); notes 20, 22 and accompanying text
supra.
109. See notes 65-71 and accompanying text supra.
110. Compare Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269 27 A.2d 776 (1971), and Montesi v.
State, 220 Tenn. 354, 417 S.W.2d 554 (1967), with Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112,
326 A.2d 387 (1974).
Ill. See, e.g., Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 278 A.2d 776 (1971); Montesi v. State,
220 Tenn. 354, 417 S.W.2d 554 (1967).
112. One such situation is suggested by Montesi v. State, 220 Tenn. 354,417 S.W.2d 554
(1967), in which an argument was overheard and commented upon over the telephone. Aural
perception is also sufficient to establish the occurrence of a nearby struggle or of cars racing
outside one's home, for instance.
113. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974).
114. See note I and accompanying text supra.
115. See Louisville & N. Ry. v. Cox, 145 Ky. 716, 141 S.W. 59 (1911); Shadowski v.
Pittsburgh Ry.,226Pa. 537,75 A. 730(1910); Barnett v. Bull, 141 Wash. 139,250P. 955(1926).
however, that the contemporary statements of a bystander are important
evidence. 116 When this is the case, and the declaration is made under
circumstances that provide guarantees of trustworthiness, there is no
apparent reason to reject the statement simply because it was made by an
observer rather than an actual participant. "17
E. Subject Matter of the Statement
The subject matter of the communication of present sense impression
is limited by Rule 803(1) to a description or explanation of the event or
condition causing comment. 118 This restriction is consistent with prior case
law.' 19 The limitation is based upon the assumption that the safeguard of
spontaneity extends no further in the absence of a startling event. 120 Unlike
the exception for excited utterances, 121 the present sense impression
exception does not extend to comments that are evoked by the event but
describe events or conditions preceding it or collateral to it. 122 When such
comments are offered, admissibility depends upon whether the declarant
was under sufficient nervous stress to qualify his statement as an excited
utterance under Rule 803(2). 123
The word "narrates," which is found in both the Model Code 24 and
Uniform Rules' 25 versions of the exception, has been eliminated from the
text of Rule 803(1). 126 This again illustrates a clear intention to exclude
from the present sense impression exception narratives of past events or
conditions evoked by an event or occurrence. A statement of this type is
found in Illinois Central Railway Co. v. Lowery,' 27 in which a witness
testified that the defendant's servant exclaimed, "The damn thing was
about wore out anyhow, and they would keep running it until they killed
somebody." This statement did not describe the accident, but a condition
that the declarant had noticed earlier; it thus did not meet the criteria for a
present sense impression. 128 This limitation does not mean that the
116. See, e.g., Picker X-ray Corp. v. Frerker, 405 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Murphy, 186F.2d 8(6thCir. 1951); Kelly v. Hanwick, 228 Ala. 336, 153 So.
269(1934); State v. Fletcher, 190 S.W. 317(Mo. 1916); Hornschuch v. Southern Pac. Co., 101
Ore. 280,203 P. 886(1921); State v. Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624(1938); Montesi v. State,
220 Tenn. 354,417 S.W.2d 554(1967); White Star Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 32 Tenn. App. 177,
222 S.W.2d 209 (1949); McCullom v. McClain, 227 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Jackson
v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 21,290 P. 970 (1930); Heg v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 P.
51 (1921).
117. See cases cited, note 116 supra.
118. Major Changes, supra note 4, at 561.
119. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Lowery, 184 Ala. 443, 63 So. 952 (1913); Young v.
Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926); Silver Seal Prods. Co. v. Owens, 523 P.2d 1091
(Okla. 1974); Marks v. I.M. Pearistein & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835 (1943); State v.
Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938); White Star Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 32 Tenn. App.
177,222 S.W.2d 209(1949); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139Tex. I, 161 S.W.2d474(1942).
120. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
121. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
122. MORGAN, supra note 25, at 343; WEINSTEIN, supra note 38, 803(l)[01I.
123. MORGAN, supra note 25, at 343; WEINSTEIN, supra note 38, 803(I)[01].
124. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
125. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
126. See note I and accompanying text supra.
127. 184 Ala. 443, 63 So. 954 (1913).
128. Thayer, supra note 25, at 72-73.
statement must be in response to the principal event or transaction
litigated.129 A narrow interpretation could exclude evidence elucidating
the event and aiding factfinders in assessing it. If the comment was made in.
reaction to one of the circumstances leading up to a final event or condition,
it should be admitted under Rule 803(1).130
Courts that recognize the present sense impression have not used the
opinion rule13 ' to exclude present sense impressions, even though they
very often announce opinions. 32 Most of these declarations could be
considered within the established exception to the opinion rule for state-
ments of collective facts. 133 The courts reason that the opinion aspect of
present sense impressions does not create an undue risk of unreliability so




Rule 803(1) sets forth an exception to the hearsay rule which em-
braces statements made by a declarant during or immediately following the
event or condition that occasioned it. The trustworthiness of these com-
ments, made in reaction to unanticipated situations, derives from their
spontaneity and the unlikelihood of fabrication.
This exception will undoubtedly overlap the excited utterance excep-
tion135 to some degree, and in some cases either rule might apply to bring
about the same result. Rule 803(1) will probably be used most often in
conjunction with Rule 803(2) to admit statements made before the declar-
ant could anticipate the litigated occurrence, and when the remarks would
be otherwise inadmissible for lack of a startling event. Statements made
after the event that would not meet the contemporaneity requirement of
Rule 803(1) might still be admissible as excited utterances.if a state of
stress or excitement continues.
The formulation of an exception for present sense impressions is part
of the trend toward permitting the finder of fact to weigh reliability in
admitting certain types of hearsay. Although there are as yet virtually no
federal cases applying the new exception, it has been endorsed by several
courts. 136 It is evident that the exception, as adopted, is much broader than
129. This was used to exclude statements under the res gestae doctrine. See notes 20-24,
64-68 and accompanying text supra.
130. WEINSTEIN, supra note 38, 803(1)[01].
131. Evidence of what the witness thinks, believes, or infers in regard to facts in dispute,
as distinguished from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves, is generally not
admissible. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 11.
132. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481 (1946); Comment,
Excited Utterances & Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in La., 29
LA. L. REV. 661 (1969).
133. MORGAN, supra note 25, at 343; Quick, supra note 38, at 204.
134. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § II.
135. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
136. See, United States v. Chee, 422 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1970); Wabisky v. D.C. Transit
System, Inc., 309 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
any recognized by the present law of many states. Most state courts either
limit admissibility to excited utterances or recognize no specific exception
for spontaneous utterances. 137 Nevertheless, the present sense impression
will now become a recognized exception to the hearsay rule in spite of its
lack of judicial acknowledgement in the past. Some states have established
the exception as a result of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 38 or through
judicial decision.' 39 Recent decisions in several other states have begun to
recognize the exception. 40 It is likely that some states will follow the lead
of the Florida legislature' 4 ' by adopting evidence codes patterned after the
Federal Rules.
The adoption of the present sense impression exception marks a
crucial turning point, finally motivating courts to acknowledge and apply
this long-considered means of searching for truth in courts of law. The
excision of the inapplicable overtones imposed by the vague, inexact res
gestae doctrine and of Wigmore's overly restrictive interpretation has led
to the establishment of a rule more solidly based on a foundation of logic
and clarity.
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